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NOTE
Resetting the Doomsday Clock: Is it Constitutional for
Laches to Bar Copyright Infringement Claims Within
the Statute of Limitations?
RYAN CHRISTOPHER LOCKE"
INTRODUCTION
For the Watchmen, the Doomsday Clock was reset-midnight
suddenly became January 6, 2009. Warner Brothers and 2 0 1h Century Fox,
two major movie studios, were scheduled to begin trial that day over who
owned the rights to the movie Watchmen. 2 The dispute centered around a
complex Hollywood contractual mechanism called "turnaround." When
rights to dormant film projects are sold to another studio, the original studio
has the option to take back the film for itself if the new studio has changed
anything about the film (such as a new director, plot line, or starring actor).3
The rights to Watchmen were first placed into turnaround by Fox in
1991.4 For the next fourteen years, the rights were sliced up, passed around,
t J. D. Candidate, 2010, University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., University of
Richmond. I thank my wife, Loren, for her constant support; Professor Dan Coenen for his
thoughtful commentary; and Matthew A. Woods, whose advice on writing this Note was
invaluable.
I The Doomsday Clock, a metaphorical invention of the Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, measures "how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction-the figurative
midnight." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Doomsday Clock Overview, http://www.the
bulletin.org/content/doomsday-clock/overview (last visited Apr. 15, 2009). The Doomsday
Clock is a recurring element in Watchmen, a graphic novel adapted into a movie. See
generally ALAN MOORE, WATCHMEN (DC Comics 1986).
2 Order Re Motion to Dismiss, Twentieth Century Fox Film Co. v. Warner Bros.
Entm't, CV08-0889 (C.D. Cal 2008) (denying Warner Brothers Motion to Dismiss and
setting a trial date); Michael Cieply, 'Watchmen' Shows Messy Side of Super Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/l0/02/movies/02watch.html (indicating
the initial trial date of January 6, 2009).
3 Michael Cieply, The Murky Side of Movie Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2008, at B5,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/24/business/media/24steal.html?ref=-business.
The film Michael Clayton was ultimately reacquired and produced by Castle Rock because
of such changed elements: George Clooney was cast as the title character subsequent to a
turnaround. Id.
4 Id
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and recombined in a complex series of turnarounds. 5 Warner Brothers
ended up with the rights--or so the studio thought-and spent $100 million
shooting the movie.6 Fox then claimed that its rights under a 1994
turnaround were violated, while Warner claimed that it notified Fox of the
impending production of Watchmen in 2005 and that Fox waived its
turnaround option. 7
This kind of dispute is common in Hollywood and is usually resolved
with a quick settlement; 8 but when Fox filed suit against Warner Brothers
and the court denied Warner Brothers's motion to dismiss, the parties
prepared for a protracted battle.9  Fox claimed its lawsuit was about
protecting its intellectual property rights, not money.' 0 Meanwhile, Warner
Brothers continued to advertise the film, including showing critics extended
clips from the finished movie days after the motion was denied, and spent
over $100 million finishing the movie as the parties entered the beginning
phases of discovery. I I The judge initially indicated that if Fox were to win,
its remedy would likely be an injunction barring Warner Brothers from
releasing Watchmen. 12 In such an event, Warner Brothers' remaining
options would be costly: buy the rights from Fox from a near-powerless
negotiating position or not release the movie.
Then, the seemingly impossible happened: the parties reached a
5 Compare Complaint, Twentieth Century Fox Film Co. v. Warner Bros. Entm't, No.
CV08-0990, (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008), 2008 WL 887552 and Answer, Twentieth Century
Fox Film Co. v. Warner Bros. Entm't, No. CV08c-00889 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2008), 2008
WL 4064970.
6 Michael Cieply, Studio War Involving 'Watchmen' Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
2008, at B7.
7 Id.
8 Cieply, supra note 3. The same judge hearing the Watchmen dispute presided over a
similar case in 2005. There, a dispute over the rights to the Dukes of Hazzard ended with an
injunction against Time Warner, followed by a $17.5 million settlement and the film's
release. Michael Cieply, Fox Allowed to Press Warner Over Rights to 'Watchmen', NEW
YORK TIMES, Aug. 19, 2008, at C2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/19/
business/media/19movie.html.
9 Order Re Motion to Dismiss, Twentieth Century Fox Film Co. v. Warner Bros.
Entm't, CV08-0889 (C.D. Cal 2008) (denying Warner Brothers Motion to Dismiss and
setting a trial date).
10 See, e.g., Michael Cieply, Battle Over 'Watchmen' Surrounds a Producer, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 20, 2008, at B7 ("But Fox executives ... were put off by what they saw as
Warner's failure to take their claims seriously, and delivered a shock by filing suit in
February.").
11 Cieply, supra note 6 (noting that Warner Bros. had spent S100 million and completed
filming Watchmen); Cieply, supra note 2 ("Judicial advice notwithstanding, Zack Snyder,
the film's director, on Wednesday showed nearly 30 minutes of the film to about 60
journalists .. "); Joint Rule 26(f) Report, Twentieth Century Fox Film Co. v. Warner Bros.
Entm't, No. CV08-0889 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008), 2008 WL 4064971 at 18 (creating a
schedule for discovery).
12 Cieply, supra note 2.
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settlement agreement. 13  Under the terms of the settlement, Warner
Brothers was permitted to release its film as planned-without a Fox logo
attached-while Fox received upfront cash payments estimated between $5
million and $10 million, a small share in the film's worldwide revenues,
and gross participation in future spinoffs and sequels.
14
Although Fox and Warner Brothers found a solution that benefitted
them both, Warner Brothers could have defeated Fox outright with the
equitable doctrine of laches, 15-a defense so controversial that it is not
available in some circuits. 16 Warner Brothers had asserted this defense in
its pretrial pleadings, but the parties settled before the judge ruled on its
use. 17 While Warner Brothers ultimately did not rely on the defense of
laches, this case illustrates the pivotal role that such a defense could have in
the realm of high-stakes copyright litigation.
This Note argues that the use of laches to bar a copyright infringement
claim within the three-year statute of limitations period is unconstitutional
under due process and separation of powers, and is contrary to the
doctrine's history and congressional intent. Part I examines the history of
law and equity, focusing on equity's migration from the ancient King's
courts to the modern American legal system. Part II explains statutes of
limitation and the doctrine of laches, generally and in the copyright
infringement context, and identifies constitutional concerns about applying
laches within the statute of limitations. Part III traces the application of
laches to bar copyright infringement actions in the various circuits, focusing
specifically on the Eleventh Circuit's use of laches in the copyright
infringement context. Part IV argues that the courts' use of laches within
the three-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional under due process
and separation of powers concerns, and is contrary to congressional intent
and the doctrine's history. Because the circuits are split, with some ignoring
13 Michael Fleming & David McNary, WB, Fox Make Deal for 'Watchmen,' VARIETY,
Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.variety.com/article/VR11 17998665.html?categoryid=13&cs=l.
14 Fleming & McNary, supra note 13.
15 Laches is Law French for "remissness" or "slackness," and is "the equitable doctrine
by which a court denies relief to a claimant who has unreasonably delayed in asserting the
claim, when that delay has prejudiced the party against whom relief is sought." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 891 (8 h ed. 2004).
16 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, 6 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 20:55 (Thomas Reuters/West
2008).
17 See Joint Rule 26(o Report, Twentieth Century Fox Film Co. v. Warner Bros. Entm't,
No. CV08-0889 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008), 2008 WL 4064971 at 8 ("(k) Are Fox's claims
barred by the doctrines of estoppel and laches since it was publicly known since October
2005 that Watchmen was being developed at WBP and yet Fox made no effort to assert its
purported rights until almost two years later, after WBP and its co-financiers and partners,
which include Paramount and Legendary Pictures, had invested significant sums developing
the picture, requested a cost run from Fox, and was offered the title rights to Watchmen by
Fox?").
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Congress's legislation concerning the issue, Supreme Court intervention is
necessary to resolve the dispute.
I. LAW AND EQUITY
Laches is a doctrine of equity. To understand laches, one must
understand the complex historical relationship between law and equity.
A. Historical Origins
In the beginning there was law. When the Normans conquered
England in 1066 AD, a set of courts was created to resolve disputes.
18
These courts-King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer-
administered law and equity together. 19 Over time, the courts became more
professional and bureaucratized, resulting in a formalistic system of justice
controlled by precedent. 20 Appeals to justice and fair treatment fell on deaf
ears. 21 Consequently, an alternate dispute resolution system developed
called chancery, known today as equity, where justice trumped precedent. 22
One of the most noticeable differences in the newly separate system of
equity was that its administrators were often clergymen.
23
Over time the two legal systems converged. The strict legal rules were
relaxed in law courts, while the freewheeling nature of equity began to
coalesce into formal practices. 24 After a showdown between the common
law courts and Chancery in 1616, these two courts began to operate as one
comprehensive legal system.25
18 See ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 12 (2d ed. 1977).
19 See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 1-7 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Wittaker eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1916 (1909).
20 See generally Michael Lobban, Preparing for Fusion: Reforming the Nineteenth-
Century Court of Chancery Part 1, 22 LAW & HIST. REV. 389 (2004) (discussing the status
and state of English equity practice in the 1800s).
21 See id.
22 See Fry v. Porter, (1670) 86 ENG. REP. 898, 902 (Ch.) ("[lf there be equity in a case,
that equity is an universal truth, and there can be no precedent in it."). This tradition was
soon lost. Sir William Blackstone noted in the mid-century that precedent had leaked into
equity, and Charles Dickens utilized that fact a century later as a plot device in his book
Bleak House. See BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 432 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1765) available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 8thcentury/
blackstonebk4ch33.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).
23 See Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW. & HIST.
REV. 245, 247 (1996).
24 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 461-62 (7th ed. 1966) (1903).
25 Id. at 461-63. King James I issued an order on July 26, 1616 that recognized the
legitimacy of equity and forced law courts to respect a chancery order enjoining a litigant
[Vol 6:2
RESETTING THE DOOMSDAY CLOCK
B. Law and Equity in America
The War of Independence rejected many British ideas, but equity was
not one of them. The Constitution specifically mentions equity and the
Supreme Court has identified American equity as comparable-but not
identical-to what the High Court of Chancery in England enforced. 2 6 The
major difference is American equity's more legal flavor; its ecclesiastic
lineage was disregarded by the first American chancellors, lawyers with
antagonistic feelings toward the British Crown's chancellor-clergymen. 27
Today, law and equity in the United States have been merged by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 8 However, the merger was not
completed by this single act. The merger is an evolving process in which
law and equity still maintain distinctive characteristics. The extent and
consequences of the merger continue to draw the attention of academics and
the courts.2
9
C. The Effect of Merger on Remedies
A number of courts have opined that the merger of law and equity
suggests that any formal separation is anachronistic. 30 Still, equitable
defenses are generally limited to areas where the law has not spoken. The
old equitable maxim "equitas sequitur legem" has been reformatted for
modem times: "a court in equity may not do that which the law forbids." 3 1
As a general rule, equity will not act "wherever the rights or the situation of
the parties are clearly defined and established by law." 32
This general rule leaves little room for equity to work. Some courts,
wishing to grant a remedy that the law prohibits, have ignored the general
from appearing before the law court. Id.
26 U.S. CONST. art. 111, § 2 (extending judicial power to "all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution .... ); see also Bein v. Heath, 53 U.S. 168, 178 (1851)
(linking American equity jurisdiction with British equity jurisdiction); see John R. Kroger,
Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American Judging, 34 Hous. L. REV.
1425, 1440-71 (1998) (describing the Supreme Court's understanding of equity).
27 See Robert von Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 75 U. PA. L.
REV. 287, 288-89 (1927) (describing how early American colonists were antagonistic to the
Crown's chancellors).
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
29 See Symposium, Modern Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1993).
30 See, e.g., Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) ("[W]ith the
merger of law and equity, it is difficult to see why equitable defenses should be limited to
equitable suits any more .... ); see also Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 1201 (1990) (defending expanding equitable defenses to law).
31 United States v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg, Inc., 911 F.2d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1990).
32 Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893) (pre-merger of law and equity);
see Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 485 (1997) (post-merger of law and
equity).
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rule and used equity to circumvent the law. This widespread practice has
created a new equitable maxim: "a court in equity might not do that which
the law forbids."
33
II. LACHES AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN THE COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT CONTEXT
A. The Statute of Limitations
A statute of limitations is a creation by a lawmaking body to bar
claims after a certain time period. It is a value judgment, marking when the
interests in protecting colorable claims are overtaken by the interests in
barring the prosecution of stale claims. 34 Statutes of limitations serve a
number of purposes: (1) they provide peace of mind to potential defendants
by releasing them from the specter of potential liability; (2) they prevent
fraud by barring the prosecution of claims on evidence that has been
degraded or lost; (3) they enhance commercial intercourse by preventing
the disruption of litigation; and (4) they test whether claims are meritorious
by encouraging diligent prosecution.
The statute of limitations for copyright infringement is three years.
35
This time limit was created in a 1957 amendment to the Copyright Act in
order to promote uniformity and certainty about copyright infringement
claims.36 Prior to then, courts looked to the state statutes of limitations to
determine when to bar a claim. This encouraged forum shopping because
different time periods applied depending on where the claim was brought.
3 7
33 See In re Saxman, 325 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing limited exception in
bankruptcy to general rule barring discharge of student loan debt). The court held that the
equitable power prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act regarding student loan debt could not
expand or exceed statutory criteria; otherwise equitable power would eviscerate statutory
provisions. Id. at 1173-74.
34 United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) ("'[T]he right to be free of stale
claims in time comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them ....') (quoting Order of
R.R. Tel. v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)); see also Ivani Contracting
Corp. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 259 (2nd Cir. 1997) ("The first attempt at
legislating a period of limitations is found in the statute of 32 Henry Vill (1541) and was
restricted to actions involving real property. It was superseded by the statute of 21 James 1,
ch. 16 (1624), extending the limitation to personal actions as well as real. Modem statutes of
limitations trace directly back to 1624, and embody the notion that fixing the periods for
bringing damages actions is a legislative function that imposes certainty and predictability
upon how long a defendant should be subject to suit.").
35 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2002).
36 An Act to Amend Title 17 of the United States Code Entitled "Copyrights" to Provide
for a Statute of Limitations with Respect to Civil Actions, PUB. L. No. 85-3 13, 71 Stat. 633
(1957), (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 507(b)).
37 Auscape Int'l v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("[T]he goal of a uniform three year limitations period was to remove the uncertainty
concerning timeliness that had plagued the copyright bar.").
[Vol 6:2
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The committee reports to the 1957 amendments to the Copyright Act
specifically mention this concern when creating the three-year statute of
limitations.
3 8
Although Congress has explicitly created a three-year statute of
limitations, the issue of timeliness remains nebulous because colorable
claims may be barred by laches before the three-year time limit expires.
Further confusing the issue, the circuits enforce laches unevenly and, in
some cases, not at all.
B. Laches
The defense of laches first arose in equity when remedies were not
bound by statutes of limitations. 39 The defense is premised on the maxim
that equity aids the vigilant and discourages those who sleep on their
rights. 40 It operates as an equitable version of the statute of limitations-
enforcing a "use it or lose it" philosophy to waiting claims. However,
laches is distinct from statutes of limitations in its focus. Statutes of
limitations are a legislative policy determination that the public interest is
served by dismissal of a time-barred claim, operating without regard to the
instant situation; laches is an equitable doctrine focusing on the individual
interests of the parties. 4 1 The Supreme Court justified the doctrine on a
number of grounds:
The doctrine of laches is based upon grounds of public policy, which
requires for the peace of society the discouragement of stale demands;
and where the difficulty of doing entire justice by reason of the death of
the principal witness or witnesses, or from the original transactions
having become obscured by time, is attributable to gross negligence or
deliberate delay, a court of equity will not aid a party whose application
is thus destitute of conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.4 2
38 1957 Statute of Limitations Amendment to the Copyright Act, S. Rep. No. 85-1014,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1961-62 ("[Applying state
limitations periods] leads to quite a diversity of statutes of limitations with regard to
copyrights .... This in turn also permits 'forum shopping' by claimants.").
39 2 John Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, §§ 418-19a (5th ed. 1941).
40 Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002).
41 Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1977) ("Statutes of limitations are not
directed to the merits of any individual case, they are a result of legislative assessment of the
merits of cases in general. The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered
nonassertible is an unfortunate, occasional by-product of the operation of limitations.").
42 Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890); see Schroeder v. Schlueter, 407
N.E.2d 204, 207 (1I1. App. Ct. 1980).
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C. Laches Within the Statute of Limitations
Enforcing laches within the statute of limitations raises serious
Constitutional questions regarding separation of powers and due process. 43
1. Separation of Powers. The U.S. Constitution separates its power
into three coordinating branches: the legislative, with the power to create
law; the executive, with the power to approve and execute law; and the
judiciary, with the power to expound and enforce law.44 Each branch
defines its powers within its constitutional sphere, and is entitled to great
deference from the other branches. 45 With respect to the relationship
between the judicial and legislative branches, the Supreme Court has made
it clear that when a law is unambiguous and constitutional, "the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." 46 The courts
are not allowed to trespass into the domain of Congress by abridgment,
amendment, or alteration of legislative enactments. 47
Statutes of limitation are created by the legislature while laches is
enforced by the judiciary. When Congress has created an explicit and
unambiguous period of limitation and a court undercuts that period by
enforcing laches within the time limit, then that court is acting
unconstitutionally.
Some courts have dealt with this issue by creating a rebuttable
presumption against laches when a claim is filed within the statute of
limitations. 48 Other courts use the statute of limitations as a guide in
evaluating the laches defense, but warn that the statute of limitations is not
43 These Constitutional questions have caused one commentator, William Patry, to
vigorously attack the use of laches within the statute of limitations period in his treatise. 6
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 20:55 (2008). The entry begins: "the availability
of laches for conduct occurring within the limitations period is impermissible." Id.
44 See generally U.S. CONST.
45 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) ("[lun the performance of their
assigned constitutional duties[,] each branch of government must initially interpret the
Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the
others."); Hillis v. State, Dept. of Ecology, 131 Wash. 2d 373, 390 (Wash. 1997) ("Just
because we do not think the legislators have acted wisely or responsibly does not give us the
right to assume their duties or to substitute our judgment for theirs. The judiciary is the
branch of government that is empowered to interpret statutes, not enact them.").
46 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
47 See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
48 This applies most strongly to statutory remedies. Lyons P'ship. v. Morris Costumes,
Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 797-99 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that judicially created doctrines, such as
laches, should not be used to undermine legislatively crafted remedies). However, this
principle was questioned in Teamsters & Employers Welfare Trust of Ill. v. Gorman Bros.
Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2002) (arguing that courts do not reject the
application of equitable principles to lengthen limitation periods and that a double standard
should not be applied).
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necessarily conclusive.49 Still others only allow laches to bar relief for past
infringement, holding it inapplicable to prospective relief.50 In contrast,
some courts allow laches to bar equitable relief even though legal relief for
the same violation would not be barred. 51
The Supreme Court has consistently upheld Congress's absolute
power to set a statute of limitations. The Court has been extremely clear: "If
Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it
created, there is an end of the matter. The Congressional statute of
limitation is definitive." 52 The Court has also recognized that applying
laches within a statute of limitations would frustrate the will of the
legislature. 53
2. Due Process of Law. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
guarantees due process whenever a governmental action deprives a citizen
of life, liberty, or property. 54 A person at risk of a governmental taking of
property must be afforded an opportunity to meet the government's case at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.55
The holder of a copyright has a property interest in enforcing that
copyright. Like other property owners, the holder of a copyright has the
right to exclude others from using it. 56 Inherent in that right is the time limit
49 Goodman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804-05 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating
that the running of the analogous statute of limitations is merely one factor to be considered).
50 Bellsouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Am. Bus. Lists, Inc., WL 338392, at *6 (N.D. Ga.
Sept. 8, 1992).
51 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946); In re Marriage of Plescia, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 120, 124-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that defense of laches was available
notwithstanding the legislature's abolition of a statute of limitations). The California
legislature has limited Plescia. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4502(c) (West 2004) (precluding laches
unless claim is brought by government entity); see also County of Oneida, N.Y. v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 244 n.16 (1985) ("[A]pplication of the equitable defense of
laches in an action at law would be novel indeed.").
52 Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395. However, the court also noted that equitable tolling
doctrines are read into every federal statute of limitation. Id. at 397. Between those two
statements, the one quoted has received widespread support and the second statement should
be considered erroneous. See Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Ass'n, 588 N.W.2d 565 (Neb.
1999) (valuing a statute of limitations tailored specifically to claims arising from uninsured
motorist coverage by the Nebraska legislature over a general statute of limitations).
53 Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting
that application of laches "would not risk frustrating the will of the Legislature" because
there was no Congressionally-created statute of limitations controlling the claims at issue).
54 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]o state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."). This right has been incorporated to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)
(identifying that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Fifth Amendment's due
process clause to the states).
55 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
56 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(a)-201(e) (2006) (establishing ownership of copyright and unlimited
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in which the right can be brought.57
Courts have found that shortening the time available to a
Constitutionally-guaranteed remedy violates due process. For example, the
Ohio Constitution guarantees its courts to be open to remedy by due course
of law-a provision that is analogous to the Fifth Amendment. 58 In
Brennaman, v. R.M.I. Co., the Ohio Supreme Court held that a law creating
a ten-year statute of repose for certain negligence claims arising from
constructing property improvements violated the due process provision of
the Ohio Constitution. 59 The court was worried that the claimant would be
unable to discover the injury prior to the ten-year limitation. 60 The court
held that the Ohio due process clause requires "the plaintiffs have a
reasonable period of time to enter the courthouse to seek compensation after
the accident." 6 1 Although Brennaman overruled an earlier decision of the
Ohio Supreme Court, it was not an aberrant one. The court struck down
another attempt to create statutes of repose five years later.
62
D. The Application of Laches
The circuits that allow the defense of laches follow a similar
construction of the elements, but how each element is applied varies. 63 To
assert the defense, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew of the
violation but chose to withhold suit.64 Courts consider three elements: (1)
whether there was a delay, (2) whether the delay was unreasonable, and (3)
whether the defendant was prejudiced.65
alienability of the copyright interest); 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)-501(f)(2) (2006).
57 17 U.S.C. §§ 501(a)-501(f)(2) (2006).
58 OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 16; Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp.
Ass'n, 502 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1986) ("Both the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee due process of law
.... 1 .)
59 Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425, 430-31 (Ohio 1994). A statute of repose is
different from a statute of limitations because the statute of limitations runs from when the
cause of action accrues; the statute of repose runs from an event that may occur before the
cause of action accrues. Id. at 431 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 430. The claimant in the instant case both discovered the injury and filed suit in
the eleventh year. Id.
61 Id.
62 Brennanman, 639 N.E.2d at 430 (overruling Sedar v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 551
N.E.2d 938 (Ohio 1990)); State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d
1062, 1085-86 (Ohio 1999) (rejecting the General Assembly's attempt to create statutes of
repose limiting product liability, professional malpractice, and medical malpractice claims).
63 To prevent frustration, it is helpful to remember that "equity eschews mechanical
rules; it depends on flexibility." Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946).
64 Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 952-55 (9th Cir. 2001).
65 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.06 (2004);
see, e.g., Thornton v. J. Jargon Co., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1268 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (analyzing
the laches defense using three elements). Some courts combine the first and second
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For the first element of delay, some commentators believe the clock
starts contemporaneously with the infringing act that prompted the
lawsuit.66 However, some courts do not start the clock until the plaintiff has
actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing act.67
For the second element of reasonableness, courts examine the cause of
the delay. 68 If the plaintiff delayed in order to exhaust administrative
remedies, to evaluate and prepare a complicated claim, or to determine
whether the cost of litigation was justified by the infringement-or if the
work was not being exploited by the defendant during this period-then the
court will likely find the delay reasonable. 69 Conversely, if the plaintiff is
using the delay as a pretext to judge the commercial viability of the
underlying copyright, then the court will likely find the delay
unreasonable. 70 As Judge Learned Hand described in a seminal quotation:
It must be obvious to every one familiar with equitable principles that it
is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an
intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer
spends large sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only
when his speculation has proved a success. Delay under such
circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk with the
other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he might win. 71
For the third element of prejudice, courts characterize prejudice as
evidentiary or expectations-based. 72 Evidentiary prejudice occurs when the
elements, considering them together as "unreasonable delay." See, e.g., Sherry Mfg. Co. v.
Towel King of Fla., Inc., 1983 WL 1155, at *6 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (analyzing the laches
defense using two elements).
66 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 65 (comparing laches with the statute of limitations as
both measure from the time of the infringing act).
67 See, e.g., Baker Mfg. Co. v. Whitewater Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1008, 1011 (7th Cir.
1970) (noting that laches requires express or implied acquiescence in the alleged wrong, and
that the acquiescence must be predicated on express or implied knowledge).
68 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954.
69 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 65.
70 Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) ("[The plaintiff's]
knowledge of the proposed infringement went back to December, and debars him from any
profits whatever, since the defendant did most of its exploitation after that time."); Kepner-
Tregoe, Inc. v. Executive Dev., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 474, 487-88 (D.N.J. 1999) (holding
delay unreasonable because the plaintiff had previously accused defendant of copyright
infringement 14 years earlier and thus was under a duty to monitor the allegedly infringing
work). But see Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. v. Poli, 783 F. Supp. 670, 680-81 (D. Mass. 1991)
(holding delay reasonable because the defendant's infringing activities escalated during the
delay period), and MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952
F.2d 769, 780 (3rd Cir. 1991) (finding that the Copyright Act does not impose upon the
plaintiff a continuing duty to discover copyright infringements).
71 Haas, 234 F. at 108.
72 NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 65.
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delay results in loss of records, destruction of evidence, fading memories,
or unavailability of witnesses. 73 Expectations-based prejudice occurs when
the defendant acts in reliance on the assumption that his rights in the
infringing material are good and settled.
74
III. THE APPLICATION OF LACHES TO BAR
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS IN THE VARIOUS CIRCUITS
A. Laches in the Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the availability of laches in a recent
landmark opinion, Peter Letterese & Associates, Inc. v. World Institute of
Scientology Enterprises.75 In this case, the dispute arose over a book by Les
Dane entitled Big League Sales Closing Techniques.76 The founder of
Scientology, L. Ron Hubbard, began incorporating portions of the book into
public and private Scientology courses and even hired Dane to teach several
of them. 77 After Dane's death, Peter Letterese acquired the rights to Big
League Sales.78 Eventually, Letterese sued the Church of Scientology for
73 Id.
74 See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding both kinds
of prejudice supported laches when witnesses had died and the defendant had invested $1
billion in the James Bond franchise). But see Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131
F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955) (rejecting the laches defense because the defendant knew he
was infringing when he produced the television show and thus was not prejudiced).
75 Peter Letterese & Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287,
1294 (1 Ith Cir. 2008). Letterese has since been cited positively by the Eleventh Circuit in
Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer Res., Inc., 542 F.3d 859, 867 n.9 (11 th Cir. 2008)
(citing Letterese for the proposition that "laches may provide an equitable defense even to
timely filed infringement actions under extraordinary circumstances.").
76 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1294.
77 Id. at 1294-95.
78 Id. at 1295. Shortly after Letterese acquired the rights to the book, he was
excommunicated from Scientology for violating presumably unrelated Church policies.
Interestingly, he continued to regard himself as a Scientologist and his publishing house's
attorney emphasized its intention not to stop Scientology's use of the book. Id. at 1295-96.
Since the decision in this case barring their claim, Peter Letterese and Assocs. have filed a
civil suit almost too fantastic to believe. Seeking damages under every provision of RICO,
Letterese claims that "not only CSI and Bridge but the American Arbitration Association,
prominent lawyers and their firms, Tom Cruise, Google, Yahoo!, CDI's former employees,
[attorneys representing the defendants], various members of the dental industry, a competitor
of Plaintiffs in the dental industry known as Dentaltown.com LLC, and David Cornell, a
former client of Letterese and resident of Toronto," along with 3,238 individual co-
conspirators, are engaged in a fourteen-year, ten-phase conspiracy committed to
"defamation, setting up websites, unsuccessfully attempting to induce Letterese to act
against the interests of his copyright licensor, seducing courts to ignore or misinterpret
evidence, harassing the plaintiffs in litigation . . . . and general dirty tricks." Motion to
Dismiss, Letterese v. The Church of Scientology Int'l, Inc. (S.D. Fla. 2008) (No. 08-CIV-
61109), 2008 WL 3991844.
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copyright infringement.
79
The final section of the opinion affirms the district court's summary
judgment for the Church of Scientology on the defense of laches.8 ° The
court notes that the circuits are split on whether laches is available within
the three-year statute of limitations for copyright infringement, and that this
question is one of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit. 8 1 The court could
not bring itself to answer that question with an absolute "no," answering
instead with a presumptive "no:" "there is a strong presumption that a
plaintiffs suit is timely if it is filed before the statute of limitations has run.
Only in the most extraordinary circumstances will laches be recognized as a
defense." 82 The court also limited the utility of laches to barring
retrospective damages, not prospective relief.83
Although the issue of laches operating within the statute of limitations
was a question of first impression, district courts in the Eleventh Circuit
have quietly applied a perfunctory treatment to this issue for nearly half a
century.
In 1965, a district court in Florida noted in dicta that, irrespective of
the three-year statute of limitations, inexcusable delay resulting in prejudice
could support a defense of laches. 84 The same district court cited that case
nearly six years later when it rejected a laches defense in Sherry
Manufacturing Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., in 1971.85 A district
court in Georgia joined the Florida court eighteen years later when it
rejected a laches defense to a preliminary injunction in Georgia Television
Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc., in 1989.86 Sherry Manufacturing and
Georgia Television are notable because they implicitly recognize the
availability of laches by rejecting it on the merits.8 7
The Eleventh Circuit backed away from this implicit recognition,
79 Letterese, 533 F.3d at 1297.
80 Id. at 1319.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1320. This "extraordinary circumstances" part has been used by a District Court
in Wisconsin in denying a security bond because the court cannot conclude the plaintiffs
case is frivolous-laches likely will not bar the claim because it is not extraordinary. Rudich
v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studio, Inc. (W.D. Wis. 2008), 2008 WL 4693409. In that case,
the plaintiff brought suit twenty years after the original infringement-when the movie was
released on videocassette-but contends that a recent DVD release within the statute of
limitations created new media and is a separate act of infringement. Id
83 Id. at 1321.
84 Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D. Fla.
1965).
85 Sherry Mfg. Co., v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 1983 WL 1155 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
86 Georgia Television Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc., 718 F. Supp 939 (N.D. Ga.
1989).
87 Id. The plaintiff delayed filing suit only a few months after obtaining knowledge of
the copyright infringement. Id.
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however, when a laches issue reached the court in 2002. In Calhoun v.
Lillenas Publishing, the composer of a musical work sued for copyright
infringement. 88 The court affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff
on the merits of the case in a per curiam opinion. 89 In a concurring opinion
spurred by the "perfect storm" of facts in the case, Judge Birch wrote to
identify an alternative basis for affirming the district court: unreasonable
delay.90 He began by noting that using unreasonable delay to bar a
copyright infringement action with a bona fide claim of independent
creation is one of global first impression. 91 He asserted that he was not
applying a laches analysis, instead analyzing the case as a declaratory
judgment action.92 Why Judge Birch was so adamant in distinguishing his
analysis from a laches analysis becomes clear in the next sentence:
Moreover, this avoids the need to embrace one side or the other in
applying the laches defense. The circuits are split on whether it is
appropriate to consider a laches defense where an infringement action
is brought within the statutory three-year period of limitations. 93
Remarkably, Judge Birch neglects to cite any of the previous district
court decisions implicitly recognizing laches. Despite Judge Birch's caution
in approaching the issue, lower courts in the Eleventh Circuit continued to
implicitly recognize laches and ignore the existence of a circuit split on the
issue.9
4
Four years after Judge Birch's identification of a circuit split, a lower
court took notice. In Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., a district
court in Florida denied the laches defense because the defendants had not
shown inexcusable delay or undue prejudice.95 This time, the court
identified a circuit split, but followed Judge Birch's lead in not embroiling
the Eleventh Circuit: "The Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the
88 Calhoun v. Lillenas Publ'g, 298 F.3d 1228 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
89 Id. at 1235.
90 Id. at 1235 (Birch, J., concurring).
91 Id.
92 Id. at n.3.
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Hibiscus Homes of Fla., Inc., No. 603CV1860
ORLI9KRS, 2005 WL 3445522, at *8 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (ordering summary judgment
against defense of laches because plaintiff merely neglected to discover the infringement,
which is not sufficient to establish laches, and defendant was not severely prejudiced by the
delay); see also Home Design Servs., Inc. v. Park Square Enters., Inc., No. 6:02-CV-637-
ORL28JGG, 2005 WL 1027370, at *9, (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2005) (finding that a delay of less
than one year in filing suit is not unreasonable and thus cannot support a laches defense).
95 Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1177 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
[Vol 6:2
RESETTING THE DOOMSDAY CLOCK
subject." 96
Shortly thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the subject in
Thompson v. Looney's Tavern Productions, Inc..97 In a case about whether
a number of screenplays infringed on the books upon which they were
based, the court entered into a laches analysis:
Appellant had known of Defendants' alleged plans to make a movie
since 1992, yet waited until May of 2001 to file this lawsuit. Appellant
was equitably estopped from now claiming that Defendants' conduct
was infringing. Appellant's delay was inexcusable and prejudicial to
the Defendants and therefore, her claim was barred by laches. See
Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To
demonstrate laches, the defendant must prove both an unreasonable
delay by the plaintiff and prejudice to itself.").98
In 1971 in Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, the court considered the
mirror image of the availability of laches. 99 Rather than asking the court to
shorten the statute of limitations, the plaintiff in Prather asked the court to
extend it under a local rule. 100 The court declined to do so, relying on the
legislative history of the three-year statute of limitations for copyright
infringement. 101
The court noted that there was no statute of limitations on copyright
infringement suits before 1957.102 This encouraged forum shopping,
because there was a wide divergence between the circuits as to when claims
would be time-barred.103 In passing 17 U.S.C. § 115(b), Congress acted to
provide a uniform statute of limitations throughout the United States. 10 4
Although the court found a reference to recognizing "equitable
considerations of the locality" in the committee report, the court refused to
allow that statement to undercut the very purpose of § 115(b). 10 5 The court
wrote:
96 Id. at 1176-77.
97 Thompson v. Looney's Tavern Prods., Inc., 204 Fed. App'x. 844 (1Ith Cir. 2006).
98 Id. at 852.
99 Prather v. Neva Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 1971). The Eleventh
Circuit was created on Oct. 1, 1981 from the former Fifth Circuit. THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, R. 10.8.2, at 96 (Colum. L. Rev. Ass'n et al. eds., 18th ed.
2005). Decisions of the Fifth Circuit issued prior to that date are binding as precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11 th Cir. 1981).
100 Prather, 446 F.2d at 339. The local rule is the Florida Blameless Ignorance rule. Id




104 Id. at 339-40.
105 Id. at 340.
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These equitable considerations must be derived from general principles
applicable to every federal forum, not those peculiar to a local
jurisdiction, if the announced purpose of providing a uniform
limitations period throughout the United States is to be achieved. In
short, the federal statute seeks to nationalize the copyright statute of
limitations, but if each state can fetter, condition, and entail its effect,
we end with a parochial instead of a national statute. We refuse to so
frustrate the Congressional goal of homogeneity. 106
Despite this refusal in 1971, the Eleventh Circuit chose to disrupt
Congressional homogeneity in 2008 when it implicitly followed Thompson
in allowing laches to bar claims in copyright infringement actions in
Letterese. 
10 7
B. Laches in the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit clarified the role of laches in the copyright context
in Jackson v. Axton, where the court reconciled precedent-but without
citing any supporting authority for its conclusion-by writing, "laches may
apply whether or not any statutory limitations period runs." 10 8 A later court
expanded this seemingly simple statement by moving laches within the
statute of limitations: "a copyright holder would be vulnerable to the laches
defense if he had knowledge of a planned infringement more than three
years prior to filing his action, even if he complied with the statute of
limitations by filing less than three years after the infringement actually
began."' 10
9
What makes this statement especially confusing is that the Ninth
Circuit deferred to Congress's statute of limitations seven years earlier in a
case arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA):
The district court barred the remainder of [the plaintiff]'s ADEA claims
under the equitable defense of laches. This was error because the
doctrine of laches is inapplicable when Congress has provided a statute
of limitations to govern the action. Because Congress provided a statute
of limitations to govern ADEA actions, [Plaintiff's] ADEA claims
cannot be barred by laches.I 10
106 Id.
107 Peter Letterese & Assocs. v. World Inst. of Scientology Enters., 533 F.3d 1287, 1320
(I Ith Cir. 2008).
108 Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
109 Kling v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2000).
110 Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
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Despite this clear deference to Congress, the Ninth Circuit declined to
mention Miller and instead followed Kling when it enforced laches within
the statute of limitations in Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp."' There, the court
found that the "extraordinary delay and the extraordinary prejudice to [the
defendant]" warranted enforcing laches, citing language from a prior case
outside the copyright context. 112
C. Laches in the Eighth Circuit
The Eighth Circuit bars the use of laches within the statute of
limitations. In Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., the Eighth
Circuit used separation of powers to hold that federal courts cannot "apply
laches to bar a federal statutory claim that is timely filed under an express
federal statute of limitations."
' 113
D. Laches in the Second Circuit
Ashley was adopted by the Second Circuit in Ivani Contracting Corp.
v. City of New York. 114 There, the court noted its long history of not
recognizing laches within the statute of limitations as a defense in other
contexts before resting on the separation of powers concern in Ashley. 1"
5
E. Laches in the Fourth Circuit
The leading case in the Fourth Circuit is Lyons Partnership v. Morris
Costumes, where the plaintiff sued to prevent the defendant from making
look-alike costumes of Barney, the purple dinosaur. 116 The court held that
laches can never bar a statutorily timely copyright infringement claim. 117
The court rested its decision on an extended discussion of the separation of
III Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2001). In many circuits, because
one panel cannot overrule another, a subsequent contrary opinion would be held as nugatory.
See, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 206(c) (1998) ("Reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent
panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel."). The
Ninth Circuit has no such rule. See 9TH CIR. R. 36-1 to R. 36-3 (2008).
112 Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 954, (citing Telink, Inc. v United States, 24 F.3d 42 (9th Cir.
1994)). Ironically, the Telink decision contains strong language that cuts against enforcing
laches within the statute of limitations, like "[g]enerally speaking, if Congress has provided a
specific limitations period, a court should not apply laches," Id. at 45 n.3, and "[iun the
absence of a specific limitations period, however, a court may draw on an analogous statute
of limitations in determining whether laches may apply within a given period." Id. at 45.
113 Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 170 (8th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
114 Ivani Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 103 F.3d 257, 260-61 (2nd Cir. 1997).
115 Id. at 260. The Second Circuit has cited United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480 (1935),
exclusively for the proposition that laches cannot bar a timely filed claim.
116 Lyons P'Ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 795-96 (4th Cir. 2001).
117 Id. at 797.
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powers:
[B]ecause laches is judicially created doctrine, whereas statutes of
limitations are legislative enactments, it has been observed that "[i]n
deference to the doctrine of the separation of powers, the [Supreme]
Court has been circumspect in adopting principles of equity in the
context of enforcing federal statutes." Consequently, when considering
the timeliness of a cause of action brought pursuant to a statute for
which Congress has provided a limitations period, a court should not
apply laches to overrule the legislature's judgment as to the appropriate
time limit to apply for actions brought under the statute. Separation of
powers principles thus preclude us from applying the judicially created
doctrine of laches to bar a federal statutory claim that has been timely
filed under an express statute of limitations. 118
The Fourth Circuit joins the Eighth Circuit and Second Circuit as the
minority of circuits that never allow laches to preclude timely copyright
infringement claims. 119
F. Laches in other circuits
The availability of the defense of laches within the statute of
limitations in copyright infringement actions has been addressed in other
circuits, but those circuits have given the issue cursory or erroneous
treatment.
One example of cursory district court treatment is John G. Danielson
v. Winchester-Conant Properties, where a district court in the First Circuit
denied summary judgment on the defense of laches in a footnote because
there was no unreasonable delay in filing suit. 120 The court did not
reference the circuit split. An example of erroneous treatment from the
same court is Boothroyd Dewhurst v. Poli, where the court denied the
defendant's summary judgment motion by ruling, inter alia, that laches did
not bar the plaintiffs claims because his four-year delay in filing suit was
118 Id. at 798 (citations omitted).
119 See Ashley v. Boyles's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168-70 (8th Cir. 1995)
(en banc). Consequently, Lyons has received a chilly reaction in the other circuits and has
never been cited positively. Peter Letterese and Assocs., Inc. v. World Inst. of Scientology
Enters., Int'l, 533 F.3d 1287, 1320 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (disagreeing with Lyons); Chirco v.
Crosswinds Cmtys., 474 F.3d 227, 231-36 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to follow Lyons),
TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490 F. Supp. 2d 228, 234 (D.P.R. 2007)
(same); Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Int'l Ltd., 153 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1156-59
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (same); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959-60 (9th Cir.
2001) (distinguishing Lyons); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy's Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 237-39 (3rd
Cir. 2003) (same).
120 John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 n.5
(D. Mass. 2002).
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not unreasonable. 121 In its application of laches, the court did not note any
circuit split, relied on a case from the Court Of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit for the elements of laches, and analogized the instant case to a
vacated patent case from the federal circuit where the plaintiff delayed eight
years before filing suit.] 22
An example of cursory circuit court treatment is Candle Factory v.
Trade Associates Group out of the Fourth Circuit. 123 In this case, the
plaintiffs delayed a year before filing for a preliminary injunction. 124 The
court applied a laches analysis, finding that the plaintiffs delay was
justified and the delay did not prejudice the defendant. 125 However, the
court failed to identify it as a laches analysis; the word is not mentioned
anywhere in the opinion. 12
6
IV. ANALYSIS
The use of laches to bar a copyright infringement claim within the
three-year statute of limitations period is unconstitutional because it denies
due process to litigants and ignores the separation of powers. Additionally,
the use of laches in this manner is a misapplication of the doctrine and
antithetical to congressional intent. Only Supreme Court intervention can
resolve the circuit split and correct the misapplication of laches and
abrogation of Congress's explicit statute of limitations.
A. Due Process
Enforcing the doctrine of laches within the statute of limitations
violates due process because it is a governmental taking without just
121 Boothroyd Dewhurst, Inc. v. Poli, 783 F. Supp. 670, 680-81 (D. Mass 1991),
superseded by statute, Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 132,
102 Stat. 3935 (1988), as recognized in Kasco Corp. v. General Servs., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 29
(D. Mass. 1995).
122 Id. at 680. The case cited for the elements of laches was Meyers v. Brooks Shoe Inc.,
912 F.2d 1459, 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1990). The patent case analogized to the case subjudice was
A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., No. 90-1137, 1991 WL 62407 (Fed.
Cir. 1991). A month after the A.C. Aukerman opinion was reported, it was vacated and
withdrawn after a rehearing in banc. Id. The Boothroyd Dewhurst opinion cited A.C.
Aukerman when it was bad law, a month after it was vacated and withdrawn.
123 Candle Factory v. Trade Assocs., 23 Fed. App'x. 134 (4th Cir. 2001).
124 Id. at 137.
125 Id. at 138-39.
126 See generally Candle Factory, Inc. v. Trade Assocs. Group, Ltd., 23 Fed. App'x. 134
(4th Cir. 2001). Three and a half months later, the Fourth Circuit overruled itself by holding
that, as a matter of law, "[a] prospective injunction is entered only on the basis of current,
ongoing conduct that threatens future harm. Inherently, such conduct cannot be so remote in
time as to justify the application of the doctrine of laches." Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Morris
Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001).
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compensation and it violates the plaintiffs right to procedural due process.
A holder of a copyright has a property interest in enforcing that copyright-
if enforcement were not one of the sticks in the copyright bundle, the
copyright itself would be worthless. 127 When the holder of that copyright is
denied the ability to enforce that copyright because of a government action
without the opportunity to meet the government's case at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner, there has been a taking worthy of
compensation.
The right to enforce a copyright exists for three years past the date of
infringement. When a court enforces laches within the three-year statute of
limitations period, it is taking the right to enforce a copyright without
compensation. The court has taken a viable right to enforcement and
extinguished it because it believes that the public would benefit from the
discouragement of stale claims and that the individual interests of the
defendant outweigh the plaintiffs right to enforcement. In other words, the
court is taking the plaintiffs property because enforcing that right would be
bad for the public-the essence of a taking.
Additionally, the court is making a determination that enforcing the
copyright would not "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," the
Constitution's stated purpose for copyright law. 128 Copyright law is
grounded in considering what would be best for the public-at-large. When
the court makes a decision to take someone's property because it would be
best for the public, the court has taken the property and should compensate
the plaintiff.
Enforcing laches within the three-year statute of limitations also
violates the plaintiffs right to procedural due process. A person at risk of a
governmental taking must be afforded an opportunity to meet the
government's case at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
Congress has mandated the length of the meaningful time-within three
years.129 When a court extinguishes the plaintiffs right to recovery prior to
the three-year time limit, that court is denying the plaintiff the right to be
heard at a meaningful time. This violates the plaintiffs right to procedural
due process.
The Ohio Supreme Court found a procedural due process violation
when the legislature attempted to deny plaintiffs a reasonable period of time
127 Kristine S. Tardiff, Analyzing Every Stick in the Bundle: Why the Examination of a
Claimant's Property Interests Is the Most Important Inquiry in Every Fifth Amendment
Takings Case, FED. LAWYER, Oct. 2007, at 30, 31 ("Property, in the constitutional sense, is
frequently described conceptually as a 'bundle of sticks,' with each stick in the bundle
representing a different right that is inherent in the ownership of the physical thing that we
typically think of as property, such as a 'parcel of land."').
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 8.
129 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).
[Vol 6:2
RESE7TING THE DOOMSDAY CLOCK
to enforce their rights. The court held that a law creating a ten-year statute
of repose for certain negligence claims arising from constructing property
improvements violated the due process provision of the Ohio Constitution,
a provision guaranteeing a reasonable period of time to seek
compensation-akin to the 5th Amendment. 130
There is a stronger case for a procedural due process violation when a
court exercises laches within the statute of limitations. Unlike the Ohio case
in which the legislature had to guess what a reasonable period of time
would be, here the court knows that a reasonable period of time to bring a
claim is three years. A court enforcing laches within the three year statute of
limitations is doing the same thing that the Ohio legislature attempted to do:
bar plaintiffs from enforcing their rights by creating an unreasonable time
limit in which to bring claims. A court enforcing laches is actually creating
an even more unreasonable time period than the Ohio legislature attempted
to create because there is no bright line. The equitable nature of laches
precludes any notice to future plaintiffs about exactly what the time limit is,
and thus works even more unfairness than the Ohio's ten-year statute of
repose.
B. Separation of Powers
Enforcing laches within the statute of limitations violates the
separation of powers because the court is trespassing into the domain of
Congress by amending a legislative enactment.
Congress has created an explicit statute of limitations for copyright
infringement at 17 U.S.C. § 507(b): "No civil action shall be maintained
under the provisions of this title unless it is commenced within three years
after the claim accrued." By setting the limitation period at three years,
Congress made a judgment call. Congress believed that a three-year statute
of limitations was the best period of time to provide peace of mind to
potential defendants by releasing them from liability and to prevent fraud
by barring claims based on degraded evidence while allowing potential
plaintiffs enough time to discover the infringement and bring suit. It
believed that three years properly balanced protecting colorable claims with
barring stale claims. A court enforcing laches within the three-year statute
of limitations undercuts Congress's decision; in essence, the court redraws
the statute of limitations contrary to the expressed will of Congress. This
replaces a legislative policy judgment with the will of the court and is
unconstitutional.
Several circuits have recognized that they cannot spurn Congress's
130 See Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Ass'n, 502 N.E.2d
599, 604-05 (Ohio 1986); OHIO CONST. Art. I § 16.
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legislative determination that any copyright infringement claim is timely if
filed within three years. The Eighth Circuit noted that a statute of
limitations reflects a legislative value judgment that the Court is not
allowed to change. 13 1 The Fourth Circuit follows the same reasoning,
holding that separation of powers principles would be offended if a
judicially created rule, laches, overpowered a statutory timeliness
provision. 132
Other circuits have enforced laches within the statute of limitations
period. Those circuits are in error. For example, the Ninth Circuit allowed
laches to bar a timely copyright infringement claim in Danjaq.133 This
decision created a strange alternate dimension, where copyright law is
exempt from legal precedent. Eight years earlier, the Ninth Circuit correctly
refused to enforce laches within the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act's statute of limitations in Miller.134 It is unclear why the Ninth Circuit
declined even to mention Miller when deciding Danjaq. 135
Still other circuits attempt to remedy the separation of powers concern
by creating a rebuttable presumption against laches when a claim is filed
within the statute of limitations, using the statute of limitations as a guide
when evaluating a laches defense, or only allowing laches to bar relief for
past infringement. These watered-down laches analyses are still
unconstitutional. Laches itself violates the separation of powers.
The elements of laches compel courts to act as a legislature and to
make policy determinations. To apply laches, a court must determine how
long of a delay is unreasonable and if the defendant suffers too much
prejudice from the delay. These are the same determinations that Congress
made when it passed 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) and set the statute of limitations at
three years. Any time a court substitutes its own judgment for the
legislature's by enforcing laches within the statute of limitations, it is
unconstitutional regardless of how deferential the analysis is to the statute
of limitations.
The Supreme Court has been extremely clear when talking about the
separation of powers in this context: "If Congress explicitly puts a limit
upon the time for enforcing a right which is created, there is an end of the
131 See Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 170 (8th Cir. 1995).
132 See Lyons P'ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 799 (4th Cir. 2001).
133 See Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 943, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001).
134 See Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1993).
135 Miller does not necessitate that Danjaq reached the wrong conclusion, but it does
make clear that Danjaq was wrong in its grounds for the decision. The court could have
utilized equitable estoppel, acquiescence, or waiver to bar a noncontinuing act of
infringement within the limitations period. See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT §
20:55 (2008).
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matter. The Congressional statute of limitation is definitive." 13 6 The Court
has recognized that enforcing laches within Congress's statute of limitations
frustrates the will of Congress. 137 This use is unconstitutional.
C. Misapplication of the Doctrine
When applying laches, courts rely on its moralistic heritage: "[A]
court of equity will not aid a party whose application is thus destitute of
conscience, good faith and reasonable diligence."' 138 Judge Learned Hand
applied laches because delaying a suit to gamble with the defendant's
money is unfair. 139 The court in Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v.
Serbin, Inc. refused to consider laches because the defendant was a
deliberate infringer and thus had unclean hands. 140 The courts' obsession
with morality in equity ignores the American development of equity in lieu
of the old country's system.
Equity in the United States has distanced itself from its ecclesiastical
British namesake. American equitable justice is doled out by lawyer-judges,
not priests. Equity has been merged with law, resulting in a slow
hemorrhaging of equitable principles into the legal arena. The old maxims
remain, but they are now translated to focus on fairness, not strict Christian
morality. 141
When the court castigates the plaintiff on moral grounds, it is speaking
from the pulpit of old equity. American equity demands that laches is
administered to work fairness among both parties-a goal that cannot be
achieved if laches works to bar an otherwise timely lawsuit.
Additionally, although law and equity have merged, equity is
generally limited to where the law has not spoken. 142 The Supreme Court
has been explicit in subordinating equity to statute: "[c]ourts of equity can
no more disregard statutory provisions than can courts of law." 143
D. Antithetical to Congressional Intent
Congress's intent in passing 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) is clear: all copyright
136 See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
137 See Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 262 (1985).
138 Mackall v. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556, 566 (1890).
139 Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
140 See Key West Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc. 244 F. Supp. 287, 291 (S.D. Fla.
1965).
141 See generally Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, Suem-Spitz's Ultimate Equitable
Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175
(2003) (describing modem formations of equitable maxims).
142 See Hedges v. Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893).
143 Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 485 (1997)
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infringement claims run on the same clock. Copyright infringement claims
filed within three years of the infringing act are timely. Copyright
infringement claims filed outside of the three-year period after the
infringing act are not timely.
Congress passed § 507(b) in response to the opposite situation, where
each copyright infringement claim ran on a different clock depending on
where it arose. This encouraged forum shopping-plaintiffs would sue in
the states with the longest statutes of limitation.
Because some circuits will enforce laches within the statute of
limitations while others will not, forum shopping is again in vogue. Why
would a plaintiff bring an otherwise timely suit in the Eleventh Circuit-
and potentially be a victim of laches-when the plaintiff could bring the
suit in the friendly Eighth Circuit or Second Circuit? The circuit split is a
new incentive to forum shop, reviving the original impetus behind § 507(b).
E. Supreme Court Intervention is Needed
Supreme Court intervention is needed to resolve the split of authority.
Congress has legislated a three-year statute of limitations, yet some courts
abrogate it by enforcing laches within the three-year period. These rogue
circuits must be instructed to recognize the statute of limitations-both
Congress and the Constitution demand it.
CONCLUSION
Laches should not be allowed to bar a colorable copyright
infringement claim. This use confuses clients and frustrates their
expectations. How does an attorney explain to the client that he maybe has
three years to bring a claim? This use violates due process. How does an
attorney explain to the client that he should have been heard on the merits,
but now he cannot? This use violates equal protection. How does an
attorney explain to the client that his claim was dismissed because he chose
the wrong city in which to file?
When Congress set the time limit for copyright infringement actions at
three years, they were fixing a problem of unequal enforcement. Now, that
problem has reared its head again-this time as the doctrine of laches.
When a court ignores Congress's explicit limitation, it frustrates the
separation of powers by placing its will before Congress's. When a court
summarily dismisses a request that the plaintiffs property rights be
honored, it is choosing to take that plaintiff's right to enforcement without
compensation, violating his due process rights. When a court summarily
dismisses the claim because it was filed in the wrong circuit, that court is
enforcing the law unequally because of mere geography.
Copyright litigation does not enjoy a special exception from the
[Vol 6:2
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normal rules of civil litigation. Supreme Court intervention is needed to
realign the circuits and banish the doctrine of laches from copyright
infringement claims.
